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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
CASE COMMENTS
Civil Rights-Sham Private Clubs and Racial Discrimination
Doris Daniel and Rosalyn Kyles, two black women, were
denied admission to the Lake Nixon Club by the defendant-owner
Euell Paul who operated the club in a racially segregated manner.1
Located on a country road twelve miles from Little Rock, Arkansas,
the Lake Nixon Club was an amusement-recreational area offer-
ing swimming, boating, picnicking, dancing and snack bar facilities.
Plaintiffs brought a class action in the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas to enjoin the defendant from refus-
ing them admission to the club. Although Paul referred to Lake
Nixon as a private club and required a twenty-five cent member-
ship fee (which secured for the purchaser a membership
card entitling him to admission to the club for its entire
season), the complaint alleged Lake Nixon was a public accommo-
dation within the scope of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 and that defendant Paul was in violation of this Act by deny-
ing plaintiffs and other black persons admission to the Lake Nixon
Club solely on the basis of race. Plaintiffs further asserted that the
Lake Nixon Club was operated under the pretense of being a pri-
vate club in order to exclude plaintiffs and all other black
persons from Lake Nixon and avoid coverage under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. The Arkansas district court found that the plaintiffs
were refused admission to the club solely because of their race, and
that Lake Nixon was not a private club but was merely a privately
owned establishment operated for profit and open in general to
all persons of the white race. However, the district court dismissed
plaintiffs' complaint on the ground that the Lake Nixon Club did
not fall within any of the public accommodations categories of
1At the trial, defendant testified affirmatively that black persons were
denied admission to Lake Nixon simply on the basis of their race. Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 300 n.2 (1969).
2Public Accommodations Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (a) (1964). Plaintiffs
charged that the club's snack bar was a covered public accommodation under
§ § 201 (b) (2) and 201 (c) (2) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and that conse-
quently, the entire club fell within the scope of the Act under § 201 (b) (4) and
§ 201 (c) (4). Plaintiffs also alleged the Lake Nixon Club fell within the cover-
age of the Act under § 201 (b) (3) and § 201 (c) (3). Section 201 (b) defines four
categories of covered public accommodations if their operations affect commerce
or if discrimination by it is supported by state action. Sections 201 (b) (2) (3),
and (4) include:
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain,
or other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on
the premises, including but not limited to, any such facility located on
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the 1964 Act.3 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed.4 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.G
Held, reversed. Lake Nixon Club was a public accommodation with-
in the coverage of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).6
The Court found that Lake Nixon was a covered public ac-
commodation under sections 201 (b) (2) and 201 (c) (2) of Title
II because its snack bar was "principally engaged in selling food
for consumption on the premises," 7 and its advertising via maga-
zines, newspapers, and radio demonstrated that the defendant
sought "broad-based patronage from an audience he knew to in-
clude interstate travelers."8 Thus, the Lake Nixon snack bar affected
commerce in offering to serve interstate travelers. In addition, at
least three of the four food items sold at the snack bar contained
ingredients originating from outside the state and thus its snack
bar affected commerce because "a substantial portion of the food
the premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena,
stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A) (i) which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or
(ii) within the premises of which is physically located any such covered
establishment, and (B) which holds itself out as serving patrons of
such covered establishment.
Section 201 (c) contains guidelines for determining if the categories of section
201 (b) "affect commerce."
Sections 201 (c) (2), (3), and (4) provide:
(2) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (2) of sub-
section (b) of this section, it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers
or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or gasoline or other
products which it sells, has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an
establishment described in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of this sec-
tion, it customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, ex-
hibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce;
and (4) in the case of an establishment described in paragraph (4) of
subsection (b) of this section, it is physically located within the pre-
mises of, or there is physically located within its premises an establish-
ment the operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of
this subsection. For purposes of this section, "commerce" means travel,
trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several
States....
'Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412, 419 (B. D. Ark. 1967).
"Daniel v. Paul, 393 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968). noted in 21 ALA. L REv. 361
(1969).
'Daniel v. Paul, 393 U.S. 975 (1968).
For a summary of the decision see 1 RACE REL. L. SuavEy 89 (July 1969).
'Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
"Id. at 304. "And it would be unrealistic to assume that none of the 100,000
patrons actually served by the Club each season was an interstate traveler."
1970)
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which it serves. . . has moved in commerce." 9 Since the club's snack
bar was within the ambit of the Act, the entire club became a
covered public accommodation under sections 201 (b) (4) and 201
(c) (4).
Secondly, Lake Nixon Club was within the scope of the 1964
Civil Rights Act under sections 201 (b) (3) and 201 (c) (3) because
any generally accepted definition of the word "entertainment"
would include recreational areas as well as spectator entertainment
establishments.'- As a place of entertainment, Lake Nixon affected
commerce because some of the sources of entertainment (certain
boats, phonograph records, and a juke box) were manufactured
outside the state and therefore had moved in commerce.
On the issue of the alleged private club character of Lake
Nixon, the Court found that the lower courts were "plainly cor-
rect"' in holding that Lake Nixon was not a private club. The
Court defined Lake Nixon as "simply a business operated for a
profit with none of the attributes of self-government."'' 2 The mem-
bership fee device was seen as a subterfuge to avoid coverage under
the 1964 Act as white persons were "routinely"'8 given memberships
while black persons were denied memberships. Justice Douglas con-
curred; Justice Black dissented.
The significance of the Daniel decision may reach some pri-
vate clubs in West Virginia. Private clubs in West Virginia fall into
three categories.' 4 Since Lake Nixon was neither a nationally
'42 U.S.C. § 2000a (c) (1964). See Daniel v. Paul, 895 U.S. 298, 805 (1969).
"Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, at 806 n.7 cites Webster's Third New
International definition of "entertainment" at 757 as "the act of diverting,





"W. VA. CODE chi. 60. art. 7, § 2 (a) (Michie Supp. 1969):
(a) "Private club" means any corporation or unincorporated associa-
tion which either (1) belongs to or is affiliated with a nationally recog-
nized fraternal or veterans organization, which is operated exclusively
for the benefit of its members, which pays no part of its income to its
shareholders or individual members, which owns or leases a building
or othes premises, to which club are admitted only duly elected or ap-
proved dues paying members in good standing of such corporation or
association and their guests while in the company of a member and to
which club the general public is not admitted, and which club maintains
in said building or on said premises a suitable kitchen and dining facility
with related equipment for serving food to members and their guests, or
(2) is a nonprofit social club, which is operated exclusively for the bene-
fit of its members, which pays no part of its income to its shareholders
[Vol. 72
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recognized fraternal or veterans organization nor a nonprofit social
dub, it appears Daniel is relevant only to private clubs within the
third category of the West Virginia Code. Under the assumption
that a private dub within this category follows a Lake Nixon Club
form of racial discrimination and has no other justifiable member-
ship qualifications, it is possible that such a dub could be held to be
a covered public accommodation under the 1964 Civil Rights Act if
such club's operations affect commerce within the meaning of this
Act. The following discussion is made under the latter assumption.
In United States vs. Fraley, 5 the question whether a tavern
which was equipped with kitchen and dining room facilities but
whose food sales amounted to only 10 per cent of the gross receipts
was a restaurant within the range of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was
answered in affirmative. The court found that the tavern possessed
all the characteristics of a restaurant and that its dining and kitchen
facilities were principally engaged in the sale of food for consump-
tion on the premises' 6 These dining and kitchen facilities
brought the tavern within the scope of the 1964 Act. In
West Virginia, a private club categorized under the third defini-
tion of the private club law is required to have a "suitable kitchen
and dining facility."lr Therefore, such a club's license might have the
paradoxical result of simultaneously giving that club both a pri-
or individual members, which owns or leases a building or other pre-
mises, to which club are admitted only duly elected or approved dues
paying members in good standing of such corporation or association and
their guests while in the company of a member and to which club
the general public is not admitted, and which club maintains in said
building or on said premises a suitable kitchen and dining faculty with
related equipment for serving food to members and their guests, or (3)
is organized and operated for legitimate purposes, which has at least
one hundred duly elected or approved dues paying members in good
standing, which owns or leases a building or other premises, to which
club are admitted only duly elected or approved dues paying mem-
bers in good standing of such corporation or association and their guests
while in the company of a member and to which club the general public
is not admitted, and which club maintains in said building or on said
premises a suitable kitchen and dining facility with related equipment
and and employs a sufficient number of persons for serving meals to
members and their guests.
'a282 F. Supp. 948 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
"3Id at 952. The court stated:
There can be no question that the sizable dining room and kitchen areas
of the defendant's establishment are principally, if not wholly, en-
gaged in the preparation and sale of food for consumption on the
premises. Moreover, the tavern holds itself out to the public as an
eating establishment, and it has all the characteristics of a restaurant.
""W. VA. COD ch. 60, art. 7, § 2 (a) (8) (Michie Supp. 1969).
1970]
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vate club status under West Virginia law and public accommodation
status as a restaurant under the Fraley decision. The defendant
in Fraley did not claim exemption from the 1964 Act as a private
club. Rather, the defendant alleged that his tavern was not within
the Act's scope on the ground that his tavern was not prin-
cipally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises.
If a West Virginia section 2 (a) (3) club loses its private club im-
mumunity as the Lake Nixon Club did, it seems that such club could
be brought within the scope of the 1964 Act upon application of
the Fraley decision, on account of its required kitchen facilities.
It also appears possible that a West Virginia private club may
fall within the coverage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a place of
entertainment under section 201 (b) (3) in light of Miller v. Amuse-
ment Enterprises.'s The Court in Miller held that an amusement
park which provided mechanical rides for children was a "place of
entertainment" within the meaning of the 1964 Act. The interpre-
tation in Miller of the phrase "place of entertainment" (which
Daniel approves) 1 is applicable to a section 2 (a) (3) private
club.
We find that the phrase "place of entertainment" as used
in § 201 (b) (3) includes both establishments which present
shows, performances and exhibitions to a passive audience
and those establishments which provide recreational or
other activities for the amusement or enjoyment of its
patrons.2
0
The Court in Miller also cited the following synonyms for
the word "entertainment":
amusement, bodily enjoyment, fun, recreation, diversion,
relaxation, sport, pleasure, play, merriment, festivity, cele-
bration and revelry. 21
Such works would seem to be pertinent to the atmosphere
found in most section 2 (a) (3) private dubs. As the amusement park
in Miller was held to be a place of enjoyment, fun, and recrea-
tion and thus, a place of entertainment, so it seems could a section
1"394 F. 2d 342 (2nd Cir. 1968).
'Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 308 (1969).
'Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, 394 F.2d 342, 850 (2nd Cir. 1968).
Suppose, a private club allows its members to dance to live or recorded music
whether its members passively listen or actively dance, the club under Miller
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2 (a) (8) private club. It would then remain only to prove that
the club's sources of entertainment (such as phonograph records,
juke box, musical groups, singers, etc.) have moved in commerce.
The membership criteria of the club must also be considered.
The district court in United States v. Clarksdale King & Anderson
Co.
2 held that the only private clubs exempt from the provisions
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act are those whose membership is genu-
inely selective on some reasonable basis.2 The only stated qualifica-
tion for membership considered in that case was a $2.00 member-
ship fee and white skin. The court stated that the artificial device
of the attempted exclusion of Negroes by the establishment of a
sham club does not vitiate the application of the public accommo-
dation law. 4 In United States v. Richberg,25 it was found that the
membership criteria of an exempt private dub must have "sub-
stance."2' 6 In Richberg, this substance was not present since the
defendant's only grounds for membership were race and a "nominal
admittance fee."-" The alleged private dub in United States v. Jack
Savin's Private Club2s also failed to possess "substance" and genuine
selectivity in membership. The district court found that:
There are, as a matter of fact, no real requirements
whatsoever that one must meet in order to enjoy the privi-
leges of dining at this restaurant except that he be a non-
Negro, and able to pay his bill. Members of the white race
are admitted and served whether they have applied for
1288 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Miss. 1965).
PId. at 795. Only two or three memberships were rejected out of an ap-
proximate 1000 applications.
U'd at 796.
398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Id. at 529.
1id. at 528. The court quoted with approval the statement by then senator
Humphrey during the debates on the act:
If a club were established as a way of bypassing or avoiding the effect
of the law, and it was not really a club-I am sure the Senator knows
What I mean-and there are clubs like that in existence, where any-
one can step up and pay $2 and in that way become a member, and
with the $2 being used as a kind of cover charge, that kind of a club
would come under the language of the bill.
Sen. Magnuson was quoted:
The clubs exempted by section 201 (e) are bona fide social fraternal,
civil and other organizations which select their own members. No doubt
attempts at subterfuge or camouflage may be made to give a place
of public accommodation the appearance of a private orgnaization, but
there would seem to be no difficulty in showing a lack of bonafides
in those cases.
'265 F. Supp. 90 (E. D. La. 1967).
1970]
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membership in the Club or not. Members of the white
race may, if they so request, be issued a membership card
without meeting any standards or requirements and with-
out being passed upon for membership by any committee
or by the Board of Trustees. Negroes, as a matter of fact,
cannot under any circumstances use the facilities of this
restaurant, nor be issued membership cards.'
In the case of Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A. of Raleigh,'0 the Fourth
Circuit Court reversed a lower district court's denial of injunctive
relief which was sought by a black minister for the purpose of
enjoining the racial discrimination policies of the Y.M.C.A.'s
athletic club facilities. In rejecting defendant's contention that the
Y.M.C.A. was exempt as a private club from the scope of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, the court found that though the Raleigh Y.M.C.A.
required membership application, had a membership committee,
recorded its list of members, and charged substantial membership
dues, it could not be deemed a private club because evidence showed
that over 99 percent of the white applicants were accepted while
100 percent of the black applicants were rejected, that there were
no limits on membership, and that there were no admission stan-
dards or regular membership meetings. Thus, the Court held the
Y.M.C.A. to be "too obviously unselective in its membership to be
adjudicated a private club."3'
CONCLUSION
The Daniel decision demonstrates that the requirements of a
white skin and a nominal membership fee are not sufficient to esta-
blish private club status and immunity under Title II of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Other cases cited on the same subject show the
necessity of a genuine selectivity in membership before private
club status can be established. It would seem reasonable to con-
clude that the courts would not condone the operation of a West
Virginia private club formed under chapter 60, article 7, section
2 (a) (3) of the West Virginia Code if the club practiced a Lake
2Id. at 94.
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Nixon Club type of racial discrimination and sham membership
policy. Such a club might well be found to:
1) violate the 1964 Civil Rights Act; and
2) fail to qualify as a private dub under West Virginia
law.
Although not examined here, such a West Virginia club might
logically be in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act
3 2
which prohibits denial of admission to public accommodations be-
cause of race, and of the West Virginia Constitution which prohibits
the sale of intoxicating liquors in a "saloon or other public places".33
James Roy Gerchow
Constitutional Law-Freedom of Expression
The appellant, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, had invited
a television reporter to a Klan "rally." Films of this gathering were
broadcast on both a Cincinnati station and a national network.
Portrayed were several hooded figures, some carrying firearms, and
several engaged in the burning of a cross. A number of racially dero-
gatory remarks were comprehensible, and one non-volatile speech.
by the appellant was presented in its entirety.1 The appellant was
convicted under the Ohio Syndicalism Statute of" 'advocat [ing] ...
the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing indus-
trial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl [ing] with any
society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advo-
cate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.' "2 On appeal, the ap-
7W. VA. CoDE ch. 5, art 11, § 9 (Michie Supp. 1969).
IW. VA. CoNsr. art. VI, § 46: The legislature shall by appropriate
legislation regulate the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors
within the limits of this State, and any law authorizing the sale of
such liquors shall forbid and penalize the consumption and the sale
thereof for consumption in a saloon or other public place.
1None of the derogatory remarks were made by the appellant. His speech
was not inflammatory in nature, the only reference to any possible disorder being
that "[w]e are marching on Congress July the Fourth.... From there we are
dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the
other . . . into Mississippi." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969).
21d. at 444-5 citing Omo REv. Coan ANN. § 2923.13. Penalty for violation
of this act was a fine of not more than five thousand dollars or imprisonment
of not more than ten years, or both.
"Criminal syndicalism is the doctrine which advocates crime; sabotage,
which is defined as the malicious injury or destruction of property of another;
violence; or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial
or political reform." OIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2923.12.
1970]
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